A decade since the commencement of the Paris Agreement, and in view of the looming planetary crisis, climate actions taken by individual countries are increasingly being legalised and examined from the lens of international law. This is especially since the various advisory opinions on the obligations of states concerning climate change were delivered, which generated discussions on their implications for the broader international legal order, various areas of international law, and individual states. This piece is a contribution to this discussion, using obligations under international law to examine the nationally determined contributions (NDC) submitted by India. India’s climate actions are of particular interest from an international legal perspective. This is because of its unique position as a developing country, having low per capita emissions and very little historical emissions, and yet it is a major and growing emitter due to having the world’s largest population, and growing economic development and standards of living.
Key commitments made in India’s updated NDC
India has submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat, on 24 April 2026 (after several months of delay), its updated NDC under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, covering the 2031-2035 period. Under the updated NDC, India has pledged to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 47% from 2005 levels by 2035, a marginal increase from its earlier commitment of a 45% reduction by 2030. It has also raised its target for non-fossil fuel-based energy generation from 50% of total installed capacity by 2030 to 60% by 2035. Further, India has revised its carbon sink target through additional forest and tree cover from 2.5–3.0 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent by 2030 to 3.5–4.0 billion tonnes by 2035. Its long‑term goal of achieving net-zero emissions by 2070 remains unchanged. Interestingly, as a part of the NDC, India has also highlighted the need to ‘mobilize’ domestic and ‘new and additional finance’ from developed countries to implement these adaptation and mitigation measures. It has also expressed its commitment to build capacities for quick diffusion of cutting edge climate technology in India.
It is instructive to highlight the key considerations and principles that India has followed in preparing this NDC. India has continued to emphasise the need for ‘fair, equitable, and just sharing of the global carbon budget’ through the principle of CBDR-RC (p. 6). Explaining how its updated NDC is ‘fair and ambitious’ (as required under the Paris Rulebook decision), India has argued that its pledge to achieve net zero by 2070 is consistent with its developmental circumstances and ‘fair share’ of its global climate budget (NDC p. 6, 14) and that it requires its ‘fair share’ of the resources that the developed countries are obligated to provide (p. 10-12, 18). It has also noted that its commitments are ambitious, keeping in mind its historically low cumulative contribution and continued low per capita emissions, and has urged greater ambition by developed countries (p. 14, 23, 31). Like its previous NDCs, India has continued to link the effective implementation of its NDC with receiving additional support from developed countries in the form of finance, technology transfer and capacity-building. In fact, it has specifically noted that its commitments are ‘contingent’ on due support and due share of international climate finance, and that it may modify them ‘to match the level of support’ provided (p. 17-18).
India’s NDC through the lens of international law obligations
The Paris Agreement, which adopts a bottom-up architecture, requires each party to communicate successive NDCs outlining the climate actions it intends to pursue, including domestic mitigation measures. Countries are required to update their NDCs every five years, and each successive NDC must represent a progression beyond the previous one, reflecting the country’s ‘highest possible ambition’. Although the Paris Agreement itself is largely silent on the specific content of NDCs, the International Court of Justice in its climate change advisory opinion has clarified that states do not enjoy unfettered discretion in setting their ambition levels. The Court explained that the standard of ‘highest possible ambition’ is not purely subjective: an NDC must make an adequate contribution to the collective goal of limiting global average temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre‑industrial levels (paragraph 242). They must also be informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake, and core principles such as due diligence and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The adequacy of a country’s NDC can be assessed by reference to factors such as its historical emissions, level of development, and broader national circumstances.
The first Global Stocktake outcome (2024) noted that implementation of the current NDCs would fall short of meeting the Paris Agreement temperature goal (the current trajectory would only be able to limit the rise in global temperature in the range of 2.1–2.8 °C), and that higher emission reductions were required. The Stocktake also highlighted the continued relevance of historical emissions, noting that the net historical emissions already accounted for about 80% of the total carbon budget that is needed to have at least a 50 per cent probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C. This does highlight the very limited space that developing countries have, especially to avoid significant overshoots of the temperature target. Accordingly, it observed that the time frames for peaking of emissions could be different for different countries and would be shaped by factors like different national circumstances, sustainable development, poverty eradication needs and equity. Recalling Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, it encouraged ‘parties’ (silent on whether developed or developing country parties) to ‘come forward in their next nationally determined contributions with ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, as informed by the latest science, in the light of different national circumstances’ (paragraph 39).
However, despite this call, the collective ambition represented by the new NDCs submitted in 2025 still fell significantly short of what is needed to align with the 1.5°C goal and is yet to meaningfully bridge the emissions gap. A recent modelling done by Climate Resource projected that global temperature would increase by 2.3-2.6°C with the 2035 NDCs, and even if countries’ long-term net zero targets are met, the world was on track for a 1.8-2.2°C temperate rise. This is similar to the projection made in UNEP’s latest Emissions Gap Report, which found that even with implementation of the updated NDCs, we are on track for a 2.3-2.5°C rise in global average temperature by 2100. The World Resources Institute found that that the additional emissions reductions through the implementation of the NDCs (submitted as of 2025) would achieve less than 14% of the reductions required to meet the 1.5°C goal. All of these show that the window for meeting the temperature goal is closing, making it important for all countries to accordingly increase their ambition as much as possible within their national circumstances.
Seen in this context, India’s new NDC, even though a progression beyond its previous NDC, falls short against this standard of representing ‘highest possible ambition’. Even if India’s refusal to target absolute emission cuts could be justified by its developing status, per capita emissions and historically low contribution, the emission intensity reduction target was increased only by 2% over a five-year period. Considering that India had already reduced the emission intensity of its GDP by 36% as of 2020, this seems like a modest ambition. Similarly, the increase in the non-fossil fuel generation target to 60% of total installed capacity is modest and easily achievable. The 2030 goal of 50% was already exceeded as of 2025 (52%). The more difficult goal of increasing the percentage of non-fossil fuel sources in electricity generated, which remains only at 22.13% as of 2024-25, was not included in the NDC. The goal to increase carbon sinks through additional forest cover by 3.5-4 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent, is not very ambitious, considering that the government acknowledged that India had already created new carbon sinks of 2.29 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent by 2021. The more difficult challenge is improving the quality of forests. The latest Indian Forest Survey report shows a slight increase in forest cover, but forest quality has declined in many areas, particularly in the ‘moderately dense forest’ category. Further, India’s carbon sink strategy focuses a lot on compensatory afforestation (the practice of ‘compensating’ for the diversion of forests or cutting down of trees for developmental activities by creating new forests or planting trees on non-forest or degraded lands). However, this may not fully replace the carbon sinks lost when old naturally grown forests are degraded or account for its other ecological or social implications.
Overall, as some commentators have noted, India’s updated NDC goals seem relatively easy to achieve in the present trajectory and may not require significant policy change or focus. India’s goals are also modest in comparison to some other developing BRICS nations. For example, China has begun targeting absolute emission cuts and aims to increase non-fossil fuel energy consumption to over 30%. Brazil and South Africa also intend overall emission cuts and target net zero by 2050. While India’s circumstances differ from them, due to higher population and lower per capita incomes, it is interesting to note that some other developing countries with lower per capita incomes than India also have remarkably increased their ambition. For instance, Nigeria’s latest NDC targets absolute economy-wide emission cuts and aims to achieve net zero by 2060.
Conclusion
It would be difficult to characterise an individual State’s NDC as non-compliant with international climate obligations, given the range of factors identified by the ICJ. This may only arise where an NDC clearly reduces ambition or runs counter to agreed climate goals. While India’s NDC may be defensible as compliant (given factors such as historical responsibility, per capita emissions and development needs) it is doubtful, in light of the Global Stocktake and India’s growing capacities, that it reflects its ‘highest possible ambition’.
It is important to note that India is also among the countries projected to be hardest hit by the adverse effects of climate change. Further, adverse impacts of climate change and environmental degradation could impede its developmental goals. As Gita Gopinath, a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, recently pointed out, pollution is a greater structural risk to India’s economic growth than trade tariffs. It is also important to note that if India contributes more effectively to mitigation, it could face lower costs associated with adaptation, as it could lessen the overall adverse impact of climate change. It would also help India fulfil its citizens’ fundamental right against the adverse effects of climate change, as articulated by the Supreme Court of India. Further, as the recent war in Iran has illustrated, overdependence on fossil fuel is a strategic vulnerability, and green transition, apart from contributing to climate goals, also contributes to the national resilience against external shocks and supply chain disruptions. Thus, from an economic and strategic point of view, greater climate action is in India’s self-interest.
Rahul Mohanty
Rahul Mohanty is a PhD candidate at the University of Melbourne, focusing on International Climate Law and Governance. Prior to starting his PhD, he was an academic in the field of public international law with over four years of teaching and research experience, and worked as an Assistant Professor at Jindal Global Law School (JGLS), O.P. Jindal Global University, India and at NALSAR University of Law, India. His doctoral research focuses on issues of fairness in international climate governance.