Exterior of Supreme Court of Victoria

International Law in the Victorian Supreme Court

(Content warning: reference to allegations of historic child abuse)

On 24 September 2026, in Davis v Comensoli (No 3), a single judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria ruled that Pope Leo XIV, as a head of state, was immune from the Court’s jurisdiction. Four days later, in Thorpe v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, the Victorian Court of Appeal upheld a primary judge’s decision that genocide was not an offence under the common law. The two decisions raised several questions, including the status of First Peoples’ law in Australian law (Thorpe) and the interpretation of canon law (Davis). In addition, the judges were faced with a number of international legal issues. The purpose of this Perspective is to provide a brief analysis of the judges’ approach to the international law questions.

Background to Cases

The plaintiffs in Davis had brought a case against the Archbishop of Melbourne (first defendant) and Pope Leo XIV as Supreme Pontiff (and as representing predecessor Popes and the Holy See – second defendant), alleging a failure to protect them when they were children from a priest who had been convicted of indecent assault in the late 1970s [Davis, 1-2]. In relation to the second defendant, this involved an alleged failure to laicise the priest following the conviction [Davis, 2, 19]. The sole question in these proceedings was whether the Pope was immune from the Court’s jurisdiction as a head of state. In examining this issue, Keogh J analysed the common law approach to immunities, the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) (FSIA) and the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1967 (Cth), as well as the Holy See’s status in international law.

Thorpe concerned an attempt by Uncle Robbie Thorpe, a Krautatungalung Elder, to file charges alleging that King Charles III had committed acts of genocide and ecocide against First Peoples. The magistrate refused to issue the proceeding on the basis that ‘no proper source of law had been particularised’ [Thorpe, 2]. Uncle Robbie applied to the Supreme Court seeking orders requiring the Magistrates’ Court to accept the charge sheet. The application for judicial review identified three sources of law: the laws of Australia’s First Peoples, the common law, and the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), which incorporates the crime of genocide. The Trial Division dismissed the application for judicial review and Uncle Robbie appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Statehood and Head of State Immunity in Davis

The Pope’s entitlement to immunity in Davis depended on the Holy See’s status under international law – a question that has vexed scholars and practitioners. The analysis in the Supreme Court would be familiar to many international lawyers with its focus on the criteria in article 1 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (the Montevideo Convention), treaty provisions (the 1929 Lateran Treaty), and the relevance of recognition to statehood.

Two expert opinions on the question were proffered. Roger O’Keefe highlighted the flexible nature of the Montevideo criteria and the relevance of recognition by other states to the Holy See’s status. Cedric Ryngaert argued that the Holy See should be seen as ‘a spiritual organisation with its own international legal personality’ [Davis, 123]. Ryngaert underlined that ‘recognition does not confer statehood’ [Davis, 118]. Overall, Keogh J preferred the evidence of O’Keefe and accepted the Holy See’s statehood for the purposes of Australian common law and the FSIA [Davis, 261-2]

The question then turned to head of state immunity under Australian law. Given the dates of the alleged acts of abuse (both before and after the commencement date of the relevant parts of the FSIA on 1 April 1986) this was a complex question, with the second defendant contending three ‘pathways to immunity’ under statute and the common law [Davis, 229].

The first pathway was via s 36 of the FSIA,which applies the immunities of the head of a diplomatic mission in the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1967 (Cth) to heads of foreign states. The plaintiffs argued for the application of the exception to immunity in article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (scheduled to the 1967 Act), whereby ‘professional or commercial’ acts do not attract immunity. However, Keogh J had little difficulty in finding that the alleged acts and omissions, including those relating to laicisation, were ‘inextricably bound up with the office of the Pope and the legislative, judicial and administrative functions of the Holy See’ [Davis, 280]. Additionally, the plaintiff’s submissions that s 13(a) of the FSIA, which excludes immunity for ‘an act done or omitted to be done in Australia’ in proceedings involving death or personal injury, failed on the basis that any alleged acts or omissions of the Pope occurred in Rome [Davis, 318].

The claim for head of state immunity under the common law was also upheld. While the judge opined that the relevance of the theory of restrictive state immunity to head of state immunity was ‘not entirely clear’ [Davis, 304], it was clear that the alleged acts and omission of the second defendant were of a ‘government or public’ nature [Davis, 305].  Thus, they could not be characterised as private acts or outside the bounds of an immunity claim.

Genocide and International Criminal Law in Thorpe

International law was also prominent in Thorpe, with Uncle Robbie arguing that genocide was an offence known to the common law as well as statute. This argument would have the effect of bypassing s 268.121 of the Criminal Code, which requires the Commonwealth Attorney-General to bring a prosecution for genocide in Australian courts.

The status of genocide as a common law offence engaged the Federal Court of Australia’s decision in Nulyarimma v Thompson, where the majority held that although Australia had ratified the Genocide Convention, which includes an obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide, it was not a crime under Australian law (at that time). The Victorian Court of Appeal in Thorpe declined to depart from Nulyarimma on the basis that the majority were not ‘plainly wrong’ on the question whether the customary international law crime of genocide was part of the common law [Thorpe, 53, 78]. As Guilfoyle has highlighted, Nulyarimma has been followed in subsequent cases brought by Indigenous Australians alleging genocide. In this respect, the Court of Appeal’s decision is not surprising.

The major development since Nulyarimma has been the enactment of Division 268 of the Criminal Code, ‘comprehensively’ providing for the crime of genocide in Australian law [Thorpe, 76]. Section 268.121 requires the Attorney-General’s consent to commence proceedings and for the offence to be prosecuted in the Attorney-General’s name. The High Court considered this provision in Taylor v Attorney-General (Cth), an attempt to prosecute Aung San Suu Kyi for a crime against humanity,and concluded that it prevented the possibility of a private prosecution. Cormier has critiqued the approach in Taylor as having ‘narrowed the possible pathways to prosecution for international crimes in Australia.’ Although Taylor did not deal with the existence of a potential common law crime, the Court of Appeal determined that the High Court’s finding that the Attorney-General’s consent is required is ‘a very strong indication that the legislature did not contemplate the coexistence of a common law offence that could be privately prosecuted’ [Thorpe, 91]. Uncle Robbie was not successful in his appeal, although reports suggest that he is now considering other options, including the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court.

Judicial Consideration of International Law

The judges in the two decisions displayed a mix of familiarity with, and detachment from, international law. For example, in Davis, Keogh J referenced a familiar principle regarding interpretation – that is, when faced with ambiguity a court may interpret legislation consistently with Australia’s international obligations (Davis, 303). In Thorpe, the Court of Appeal repeated well known statements by High Court judges on the influence of international law on developing the common law [Thorpe, 60]. The concept of jus cogens norms was also mentioned. In Davis the plaintiff argued that redress for serious child sexual abuse was a jus cogens principle relevant to interpreting a time provision in the FSIA [Davis, 293]. In Thorpe the Court of Appeal restated the accepted view that the prohibition on genocide is a peremptory norm of international law [Thorpe, 75]. Both the ruling in Davis and the judgment in Thorpe also referenced ICJ cases. In Davis Keogh J quoted Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 on immunity. The Court of Appeal in Thorpe cited North Sea Continental Shelf on the formation of customary international law and Reservations to the Genocide Convention on the prohibition on genocide.

Neither decision resolved the question whether Australia follows an incorporation or transformation approach to the adoption of customary international law in domestic law. In Davis, the matter was not addressed – instead, the parties tendered expert opinion evidence regarding the Holy See’s status. Interestingly, the plaintiff’s earlier attempt to rely on expert evidence regarding the interpretation of the FSIA had been rejected on the basis that opinion evidence on domestic law is inadmissible. Thus, international law, or at least customary international law on the indicia of statehood, was viewed in the same way as foreign law – a stranger to Victoria’s legal system. On the other hand, perhaps because it is more familiar territory, Keogh J had no difficulty in citing an ICJ judgment on immunity or finding that the customary principle of restrictive state immunity had been ‘adopted by the common law’ [Thorpe, 304]. The Court of Appeal in Thorpe had few qualms in re-canvassing the authorities on the relationship between customary international law and Australian law, referring to previous High Court pronouncements on this question. But, given that it was not willing to depart from the majority in Nulyarimma on the status of the crime of genocide under the common law, the Court of Appeal did not have to resolve the issue.

Conclusion

Davis and Thorpe could be regarded as affirming a dualist model whereby Australian Courts view international law and domestic law as distinct, with international law needing to be incorporated via legislation to have effect in Australian law.  Yet, this description does not entirely account for the approach taken by the judges. The discussion of international law principles, and the ease with which the judges moved from analysing domestic cases to citing international authorities and treaties, would suggest an awareness and acceptance of international law. This acceptance is not encapsulated by monist/dualist and incorporation/transformation debates. Ultimately, the judges’ approach appears to align with the view of Professor (now Judge) Hilary Charlesworth, in an article examining international law and Australian law, that international legal rules must be ‘seriously considered as a resource in a task that faces us all of thinking globally and acting locally.’

Alison Duxbury
Alison Duxbury
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Alison Duxbury is a Professor at Melbourne Law School and the President of the Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law. She is also a Co-Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Conflict and Security Law. Alison’s areas of interest are international institutional law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law.